Automated license plate readers (ALPRs) build a searchable map of everywhere a driver goes, fed into databases that police, ICE, and private vendors can query after the fact. Networked across a city, ALPRs are purpose-built to track everyone regardless of suspicion. ALPRs are not a surveillance tool that can be made safe with the right policy or feature update—they are irredeemably harmful.
EFF's position is that ALPR mass surveillance—the indiscriminate, continuous collection and retention of location data on every driver, regardless of suspicion—should not exist. Because it nonetheless does, EFF also urges courts and state legislatures to impose strict, enforceable restrictions, such as warrant requirements and deletion deadlines.
EFF's position is that ALPR mass surveillance—the indiscriminate, continuous collection and retention of location data on every driver, regardless of suspicion—should not exist. Because it nonetheless does, EFF also urges courts and state legislatures to impose strict, enforceable restrictions, such as warrant requirements and deletion deadlines. EFF applies every tool available to eliminate ALPR surveillance and the harm it enacts.
The Case Against ALPRs
A note about scope: This post addresses ALPR mass surveillance. It does not address the wider universe of automated traffic enforcement (ATE) such as conventional red light and speed cameras that solely ticket a specific violation, without retaining or networking data on uninvolved drivers. But lawmakers and purchasers should guard against efforts by vendors to piggyback on ATE contracts to market ALPR mass surveillance systems.
ALPRs are frequently marketed as a narrow tool for specific purposes, such as recovering stolen vehicles. But in practice, these sensors sweep up data on every driver who passes a camera, and store it in searchable databases. That indiscriminate collection and retention is precisely why ALPR-fed surveillance systems can be easily weaponized against imm
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